Bio
I’m an Assistant Professor at the University of California, Davis, Department of Economics. I’m also a Faculty Affiliate at the NBER Political Economy Program and Development Economics Program, at the Bureau for Research and Economic Analysis of Development BREAD and at the Center for Effective Global Action CEGA, an Invited Researcher for JPAL and Weiss Family Fund, and a Lemann Fellow.
My current research focus is in the field of Development Economics, in particular, its intersection with Public, Political and Organizational Economics. As a researcher, I’m interested in two topics, poor governance in governments and social mobility, both of which I study in the developing economies context. You can find here a short research statement. My research has been published in the American Economic Review, in the Journal of Public Economics and has been featured in leading Brazilian media outlets.
I earned a PhD in Business Economics from Harvard University. In the past, I worked in the World Bank at Washington DC supporting countries in the Latin America and Caribbean Region and countries in the South Asia Region.
Curriculum Vitae link (Updated Aug 2024) Google Scholar link
Email: dsmoreira@ucdavis.edu
Tel: +1 (530) 754-1553
Address:
Department of Economics
1140 SSH building, University of California, Davis
Davis, CA 95616
U.S.A.
Teaching and Advising
Teaching
ECN 290: Development As Effective Governments
ECN 102: Analysis of Economic Data
Office Hours
If you are a current undergraduate student, please check the syllabus for updated OH
If you are a PhD student please sign up here: https://koalendar.com/e/phdoh
Publications
(with Santiago Pérez)
American Economic Journal: Applied Economics Vol. 16(3): 250–291, July 2024
Abstract (click to expand): Competitive exams are a standard method for selecting civil servants. Yet, there is limited evidence on their effectiveness. We digitize personnel and financial data to study the impacts of the 1883 Pendleton Act, which mandated exams for some employees in the largest US customs-collection districts. Although the act improved targeted employees’ professional background and reduced turnover, it did not increase cost-effectiveness in customs revenue collection. Moreover, it incentivized hiring in exam-exempted positions, distorting districts’ hierarchical structures. These results illustrate how, by triggering countervailing organizational responses, policies that succeed at improving specific organizational aspects might nevertheless fail to improve overall performance.
Ungated link
(with Erika Deserrano, Eduardo Teso and Guo Xu)
VoxDevLit, 8.1, September 2023
Abstract (click to expand): This VoxDevLit reviews the emerging literature on bureaucracy and public sector organisations. We structure the review along key drivers of bureaucrat effectiveness: (i) improving performance through incentives; (ii) through better selection; and (iii) through a better matching of bureaucrats to tasks. We end by highlighting potential areas for future work.
Ungated link
(with Mitra Akhtari and Laura Trucco)
American Economic Review, Vol. 112, no. 2: 442–93, February 2022
Abstract (click to expand): We study how political turnover in mayoral elections in Brazil affects public service provision by local governments. Exploiting a regression discontinuity design for close elections, we find that municipalities with a new party in office experience upheavals in the municipal bureaucracy: new personnel are appointed across multiple service sectors, and at both managerial and non-managerial levels. In education, the increase in the replacement rate of personnel in schools controlled by the municipal government is accompanied by test scores that are .05-.08 standard deviations lower. In contrast, turnover of the mayor’s party does not impact local (non-municipal) schools. These findings suggest that political turnover can adversely affect the quality of public services when the bureaucracy is not shielded from the political process.
Ungated link
Reply to Replication of AMT (2022)
(with Jonas Hjort, Gautam Rao, and Juan Santini)
American Economic Review, Vol.111, No. 5, May 2021
Abstract (click to expand): Can research findings change political leaders’ beliefs and policies? We use experiments with 2,150 Brazilian municipalities to measure mayors’ demand for and response to research information. In one experiment, we find that mayors are willing to pay to learn the results of evaluation studies, and update their beliefs when informed of the findings. They value larger sample studies more, while not distinguishing between studies in rich and poor countries. In a second experiment, we find that informing mayors about research on a simple and effective policy, taxpayer reminder letters, increases the probability the policy is implemented by 10 percentage points.
Ungated link
(with Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan)
Journal of Public Economics, October 2012
Abstract (click to expand): This paper examines if money matters in education by looking at whether missing resources due to corruption affect student outcomes. We use data from the auditing of Brazil's local governments to construct objective measures of corruption involving educational block grants transferred from the central government to municipalities. Using variation in the incidence of corruption across municipalities and controlling for student, school, and municipal characteristics, we find a significant negative association between corruption and the school performance of primary school students. Students residing in municipalities where corruption in education was detected score 0.35 standard deviations less on standardized tests, and have significantly higher dropout and failure rates. Using a rich dataset of school infrastructure and teacher and principal questionnaires, we also find that school inputs such as computer labs, teaching supplies, and teacher training are reduced in the presence of corruption. Overall, our findings suggest that in environments where basic schooling resources are lacking, money does matter for student achievement.
Ungated link
(with Emanuel Ornelas)
EconomiA, Aug 2008
Abstract (click to expand): The World Trade Organization (WTO) monitors trade among 151 countries, which are responsible for over 96% of the world's aggregate trade flows. Through its Dispute Resolution System, the WTO arbitrates disputes among its members with respect to possible violations of the institutions' rules and of agreements established previously under its auspieces. The goal of this paper is to evaluate the performance of this mechansim from Brazil's perspective. The paper discusses the main aspects of the workings of the Dispute Resolution System and analyzes Brazil's performance in the WTO dispute since its inception, in 1995. We find that Brazil achieved success in the majority of the disputed in which it participated. This suggests that the reduction in the number of disputes in which the country participated since 2002 may have been caused by a reduction in violations by its trading partners.
Working Papers
(with Santiago Pérez)
submitted
Abstract (click to expand): By making “merit” the main hiring criteria, civil service exams have been described as promoting social mobility and opening doors for the “talented poor”. However, their critics argue that they perpetuate existing inequalities rather than leveling the playing field. We assess whether exams help or hurt the chances of lower-SES individuals by using evidence from the Pendleton Act, a landmark reform in American history which introduced competitive exams to select certain federal employees. Using newly assembled data on the socioeconomic backgrounds of federal employees, we find that, although the reform increased the representation of “educated outsiders” (individuals with high education but limited connections), it reduced the representation of lower-SES individuals. This reduction was stronger among applicants from states with high educational inequality. These findings suggest that, if one worries about the trade-off between equity and efficiency, exams might not lead to improvements on both margins as has often been argued.
Previously circulated as: Recognizing Performance
Abstract (click to expand): Does the recognition of someone’s accomplishment spill over to others? Awards that confer public recognition for outstanding performance can impact ex-post behavior by changing beliefs, norms or interests. I investigate whether the public recognition of students’ accomplishments impacts their own and their peers’ subsequent academic performance. I exploit Brazil’s Math Olympiad "Honorable Mention" award which recognizes the top 4% of participants in a national competition involving 18 million students annually. I take advantage of the fact that no information is disclosed on the performance of those who do not win an award to recover the informational impact of someone’s recognition. Specifically, I use a regression discontinuity design comparing classrooms with narrow winners and losers of the award. I find that the award improves the future educational outcomes of both the winner and her classmates. The spillovers on classmates are economically meaningful - one-fifth of the magnitude of the effects on the winner themselves - and have long-run consequences: the enrollment in selective colleges of classmates of a narrow award winner increases by 10%. Proximity to the winner, both physical and in terms of ability, appears to be a key mediating channel: spillovers are largest for classmates in the top quartile of the test score distribution, and depend upon the presence of the winner in the classroom. The results show that ex-post motivation and effort can be enhanced by recognizing the performance of a high-achieving student.
Work in Progress
State Paralysis: The Impacts of Compliance Uncertainty on Government Effectiveness
(with Gustavo Fernandes, Socorro Martinez, Joana Naritomi, and Blenda Leite)
Funding from TAXDEV Research Fund - IFS, UC Davis Global Affairs Seed Grant, UC Davis Public Impact Research Initiative
Strengthening State Capabilities and Missing Entrepreneurs: Evidence from Brazil
(with Thiago de Lucena)
Top Math Talent: Gaps and Barriers in Career Trajectories in Brazil
(with Fernanda Estevan)
Funding from USAid DIV
Top Math Talent: Tackling Underepresentation through a Motivational Video at Scale
(with Fernanda Estevan, Richard Sedlmayr and Patricia Fearon)
Funding from USAid DIV
Policy Work
Connecting Research to Municipal Administrations: Introduction with Juan Santini. To be published December 2021. Full Chapter to be released in book “What Informs Federal Public Policies: The Use of Evidence by the Brazilian Federal Bureaucracy” organized by the Institute of Applied Economic Research (IPEA)
Caderno Vozes da Classe Média: Classe Média e Emprego Assalariado Published 2012.
Opinion, Interviews and Roundtable Discussion
In English: Podcast: The Visible Hand, 2022
In Portuguese: Podcast: das EconomistAs, 2024 ; Podcast: Esquina das Ideias, 2021 ; Roundtable moderated by Diana Coutinho ENAP at gLOCAL Evaluation Week
Media Coverage by Research Paper
“How Research Affects Policy: Experimental Evidence from 2,150 Brazilian Municipalities”
Audio and Video: [VoxDev] In print: [NPR - Planet Money] [LiveMint] [El Comercio] [Folha de Sao Paulo] [Nexo Jornal] [Folha de Sao Paulo] Write-up: [JPAL-Global] [JPAL-LAC-Nexo] [Foco Economico]
“Success Spills Over: How Awards Affect Winners and Peers Performance in Brazil”
Audio and Video: [UChicago - Social Interaction and Education Conference]
In print: [O Globo]
“Political Turnover, Bureaucratic Turnover and The Quality of Public Services”
In print: [O Globo]
“Corrupting Learning: Evidence from Missing Federal Education Funds in Brazil”
In print: [World Development Report Governance and Law] [Estado de Sao Paulo] [Veja]
